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Cover |
1 |
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Preface |
4 |
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Table of Contents |
14 |
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Eli M. Salzberger: The Rule of Law Under Extreme Conditions and International Law: Introductory Notes |
18 |
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A. The Rule of Law in International Law, or the Rule of Law in the International Arena |
19 |
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I. The rule of law in the context of the state |
19 |
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II. The rule of law in the international arena |
22 |
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B. The Rule of Law and Extreme Conditions: National Law and International Law |
25 |
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I. The rule of law under extreme conditions and the theory of the state |
25 |
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II. The normative (economic) theory of the state - foundations |
26 |
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III. The normative (economic) theory of the state – implementation I: representative democracy |
28 |
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IV. The normative (economic) theory of the state – implementation II – the structure of government |
31 |
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V. The rule of law under extreme conditions in the international arena or in international law |
38 |
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C. Extreme Conditions as Affecting the Rule of Law |
40 |
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I. Characterizing extreme conditions: national law and international law |
40 |
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II. A possible concept of the rule of law and extreme conditions |
44 |
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III. A Law and Economics approach to the rule of law under extreme conditions: A methodological note |
46 |
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IV. Models of the rule of law under extreme conditions in the literature |
49 |
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Ex-ante models |
49 |
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During models |
53 |
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Ex-post models |
56 |
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D. Conclusion |
59 |
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References |
61 |
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Hans-Joachim Heintze: Sovereignty and the “Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters” |
66 |
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A. Framework of the Codification by the International Law Commission (ILC) |
68 |
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B. Challenge of the ‘sovereignty’ concept and politicization |
70 |
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C. Right to humanitarian assistance |
74 |
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D. ILC Draft Articles |
77 |
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I. The R2P issue |
78 |
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II. Definition |
79 |
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III. Cooperation |
79 |
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IV. Principles of protection |
80 |
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1. Responsibility of the affected State |
81 |
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2. Duty to seek assistance |
82 |
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3. External assistance |
83 |
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E. Conclusion |
83 |
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Wolfgang Weigel: Comment on Hans-Joachim Heintze |
86 |
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A. Overview |
86 |
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B. A Critical Appraisal |
87 |
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Bibliography |
91 |
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Bulbul Khaitan: Discussion on Hans-Joachim Heintze |
92 |
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Peter Lewisch: International Catastrophes – an Obligation to Cooperate? |
94 |
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A. Introduction |
94 |
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B. Analytical part |
96 |
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I. Consent, lack of consent and “assumed consent” |
96 |
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II. External effects |
99 |
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III. Principal-Agent-Relationship |
100 |
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IV. Obligation to actively provide assistance? |
101 |
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C. Duty to cooperate under international law? |
102 |
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I. Introduction |
102 |
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II. Overview of legal instruments |
103 |
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III. Current developments: Issues under International Law |
103 |
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1. Definition of “Disaster” |
103 |
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2. The tension between sovereignty rights and the obligation to cooperate with regard to outside assistance |
104 |
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a) Duty to accept assistance in case of disaster? |
104 |
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b) Duty to provide requested assistance? |
106 |
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IV. The work by the International Law Commission: Draft Articles on the “Protection of persons in the event of disasters” |
107 |
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1. Goals, scope, and general framework |
107 |
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2. Basic principles (international cooperation, rights-based approach) |
110 |
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3. Sovereignty rights and tasks versus responsibility to protect |
112 |
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a) Overview |
112 |
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b) The affected state’s protective task and duties vis-à-vis recourse to external assistance |
112 |
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c) External assistance and the affected state’s (required) consent |
116 |
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4. Ancillary provisions |
118 |
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5. Current status and outlook |
120 |
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Bibliography |
120 |
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Matthias Lemke: Comment on Peter Lewisch |
122 |
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A. What we know |
123 |
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B. Issues still to be addressed |
125 |
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C. Concluding remark |
128 |
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Bibliography |
128 |
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Katharina Pfaff: Discussion on Peter Lewisch |
130 |
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Hans-Heinrich Trute: How to Deal with Pandemics |
132 |
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A. Pandemics: A global governance problem |
132 |
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I. International health law: A long tradition |
132 |
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II. What is a pandemic? |
134 |
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III. The importance of knowledge, institutions and international cooperation |
135 |
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1. The importance of knowledge |
135 |
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2. The institutionalization of a surveillance scheme |
137 |
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3. Uncertainty as part of the scheme |
138 |
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4. Inequalities: The gap between developing and developed countries and between rich and poor |
139 |
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B. The legal design of the administrative network: the international dimension |
140 |
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1. The constitution of the WHO |
142 |
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2. The International Health Regulations (2005): The basic legal frame |
142 |
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3. The establishment of a public health network |
144 |
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4. National IHR Focal Points |
144 |
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5. Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) |
145 |
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6. Notification, assessment and information |
146 |
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7. Using other sources of knowledge |
147 |
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8. Temporary recommendations |
148 |
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I. Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework (PIP): A new approach |
148 |
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1. GISRS |
150 |
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2. The benefit sharing system |
151 |
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3. Inclusion of third parties |
153 |
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4. Governance aspects |
154 |
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II. Non-pharmaceutical and pharmaceutical measures |
154 |
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C. The European dimension: surveillance, assistance and advice |
159 |
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I. Networks of surveillance, alert and response |
160 |
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II. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) |
161 |
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III. Adaption of the frame |
162 |
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D. The national system: Germany as an example |
163 |
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I. The legislative and administrative design in Germany |
163 |
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1. The Robert Koch Institute (RKI) |
164 |
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2. The responsibility of the federal states |
164 |
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3. Coordination by emergency plans |
165 |
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II. The architecture according to the IfSG |
166 |
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1. Emphasis on cooperation |
166 |
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2. Surveillance and notification |
167 |
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3. Possible measures to be taken |
167 |
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a) Measures of prevention |
167 |
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b) The importance of vaccination |
169 |
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c) Protective measures |
170 |
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E. Conclusions |
171 |
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Bibliography |
172 |
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Andreas Nicklisch: Comment on Hans-Heinrich Trute |
178 |
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A. Social Dilemma |
178 |
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B. Stimulating Cooperation |
179 |
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C. Sanctions |
179 |
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D. Conclusions |
180 |
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Bibliography |
180 |
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Felix Hadwiger / Ines Reith: Discussion on Hans-Heinrich Trute |
182 |
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Thilo Marauhn: An Analysis of International Law Applicable to the Use of Drones |
184 |
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A. Introduction: Debates and Terminology |
185 |
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I. Public Debates and Their Challenges |
185 |
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II. Drones – their Terminological Setting in Public International Law |
187 |
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B. Situations |
189 |
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I. Situations of Public Emergency – Derogating From Human Rights |
189 |
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II. Non-International Armed Conflicts |
191 |
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III. International Armed Conflicts |
193 |
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C. Rules |
194 |
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I. Drones in International Armed Conflict Situations |
194 |
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II. The Use of Drones in Non-International Armed Conflict |
197 |
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III. The Use of Drones Outside Armed Conflicts |
199 |
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D. Compliance |
200 |
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E. Conclusion |
201 |
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Amnon Reichman: Comment on Thilo Marauhn |
202 |
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Agnes Strauß: Discussion on Thilo Marauhn |
208 |
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Heike Krieger: Conceptualizing Cyberwar: Changing the Law by Imagining Extreme Conditions? |
212 |
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A. Introduction |
212 |
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B. The Paradigm Change in Security Policy and the Need to “Hype Cyberwar” |
214 |
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C. Impact on the Legal Discourse on the Use of Force |
216 |
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I. Increasing Interpretative Insecurities |
217 |
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II. Legitimizing the Use of Force |
219 |
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1. The Problem of Countermeasures |
219 |
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2. The Problem of Attribution |
221 |
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D. Impact on the Human Rights Discourse |
223 |
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E. The Way Ahead |
226 |
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Bibliography |
227 |
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Jerg Gutmann: Comment on Heike Krieger |
230 |
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A. Introduction |
230 |
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B. Is Cyberwar Different? |
231 |
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C. The Economic Point of View |
232 |
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D. Conclusion |
233 |
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Bibliography |
233 |
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Mariia Parubets / Junjie Zheng: Discussion on Heike Krieger |
236 |
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Tim Krieger / Daniel Meierrieks: How to Deal with International Terrorism |
240 |
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A. The Terrorist Challenge to the Rule of Law and to International Law |
240 |
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B. Defining and Modeling International Terrorism: The Rational-Choice Approach |
242 |
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C. Implications of the Rational-Choice Model for Counter-Terrorism Policies |
249 |
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D. International Policy Coordination |
253 |
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E. Learning from 9/11: An Evaluation of Cost-Raising Counter-Terrorism Policies |
255 |
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F. Improving the Environment in Terrorism-Exporting Countries |
261 |
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G. Conclusions |
262 |
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Bibliography |
263 |
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Stefan Oeter: Comment on Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks |
266 |
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A. General Frame |
266 |
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B. Definition of Terrorism and the Challenge of Modeling the ‘Rationality’ of Terrorist Actors |
268 |
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C. Modes of Reaction |
271 |
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D. Criminal Justice and International Cooperation in Police and Justice Matters as the Primary Level of Response |
273 |
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E. The Temptation of Revenge: Military Reactions to Transnational Terrorism and the Risks of the ‘War on Terror’ |
275 |
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F. Conclusions |
278 |
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Bibliography |
280 |
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Marek Endrich: Discussion on Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks |
282 |
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Martina Caroni: Legitimate, but Illegal? From Humanitarian Intervention to Responsibility to Protect and Beyond |
284 |
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A. Introduction |
284 |
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B. The Era of Classical International Law |
285 |
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C. Transition to Modern International Law |
285 |
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D. Humanitarian Intervention |
285 |
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E. Development of Responsibility to Protect |
287 |
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F. Further Development and Current Status of Responsibility to Protect |
291 |
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G. All’s Well that Ends Well? |
295 |
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I. SC Resolution 1973 did not break new ground |
295 |
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II. Third Pillar of R2P not acknowledged in SC Resolution 1973 |
295 |
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III. Abuse of Power by the Allied Forces in Libya? |
296 |
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IV. Veto power vs. R2P’s Third Pillar: The Case of Syria |
296 |
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H. Conclusion: How to Make the Third Pillar Operational? |
296 |
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Bibliography |
297 |
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Gad Barzilai: Comment on Martina Caroni |
300 |
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Bulbul Khaitan: Discussion on Martina Caroni |
306 |
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Roland Vaubel: The Breakdown of the Rule of Law in the Euro-Crisis: Implications for the Reform of the Court of Justice of the European Union |
308 |
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A. Introduction |
308 |
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B. The breakdown of the rule of law in the wake of the European sovereign debt crisis |
308 |
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I. The bailout |
308 |
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II. Conditionality |
310 |
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III. Macroeconomic policy co-ordination |
311 |
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IV. The purchase of government bonds by the European Central Bank |
312 |
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V. The supervision of Euro area banks by the ECB |
315 |
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VI. Transparency at the ECB |
316 |
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VII. Explaining the breakdown of the rule of law |
316 |
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C. Reforming the Court of Justice of the European Union |
317 |
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I. The status quo |
317 |
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II. Explaining the Court’s centralizing bias |
318 |
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III. Reforming the CJEU |
320 |
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Bibliography |
322 |
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Martin Nettesheim: Comment on Roland Vaubel |
326 |
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I. |
327 |
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II. |
328 |
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III. |
329 |
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Michael Fehling: Comment on Roland Vaubel |
332 |
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A. Introduction |
332 |
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B. Rule of law and law interpretation on European level |
332 |
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I. The rule of law as a cornerstone of the European legal architecture |
333 |
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II. A more complex view on law interpretation |
333 |
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III. Changing law interpretation in the light of a severe (economic) crisis? |
335 |
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C. Reform of the European Court of Justice |
336 |
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I. The problem of centralization bias in historic perspective |
336 |
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II. Convincing and less convincing reform proposals |
337 |
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D. Concluding remarks |
339 |
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Bibliography |
340 |
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Kevin Dünisch: Discussion on Roland Vaubel |
342 |
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August Reinisch: Rules for an Orderly Insolvency of States? |
344 |
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A. Introduction |
344 |
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B. Ignoring the Problem |
345 |
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C. Triggering Enforcement Action |
345 |
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D. Seeking Negotiated Solutions |
350 |
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E. New Rules for an Orderly Insolvency of Sovereign States |
353 |
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I. The Preferred Treaty Solution |
356 |
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1. Protection of the fulfilment of core governmental tasks of the sovereigndebtor |
356 |
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2. Reduction of the total outstanding debt burden |
357 |
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3. Equal treatment of creditors |
357 |
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II. The Binding Effect of the Treaty Solution |
358 |
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F. Conclusions |
362 |
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Hans-Bernd Schäfer: Comment on August Reinisch |
364 |
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A. Can collective action clauses substitute for a sovereign insolvency procedure under public international law? |
365 |
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B. The emergence of a bankruptcy procedure in the Euro-zone |
366 |
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Felix Hadwiger / Ines Reith: Discussion on August Reinisch |
368 |
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Short Biographies |
372 |
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Index |
378 |
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